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Abstract
Dirac sought an interpretation of mathematical formalism in terms of
physical entities and Einstein insisted that physics should describe “the
real states of the real systems”. While Bell inequalities put into ques-
tion the reality of states, modern device-independent approaches do away
with the idea of entities: physical theory may contain no physical sys-
tems. Focusing on the correlations between operationally defined inputs
and outputs, device-independent methods promote a view more distant
from the conventional one than Einstein’s ‘principle theories’ were from
‘constructive theories’. On the examples of indefinite causal orders and
almost quantum correlations, we ask a puzzling question: if physical the-
ory is not about systems, then what is it about? The answer given by the
device-independent models is that physics is about languages. In moving
away from the information-theoretic reconstructions of quantum theory,
this answer marks a new conceptual development in the foundations of
physics.
1 Introduction
Often hailed as a “second quantum revolution” [4], the introduction of cor-
relation inequalities by John Bell [14] inaugurated a conceptual develop-
ment whose significance took several decades to be fully appreciated. We
submit that this revolution reaches a surprising summit with the develop-
ment of device-independent approaches and model-independent physics,
supporting a dramatically new view of physical theory.
Quantum mechanics describes the evolution of a system under a partic-
ular Hamiltonian and the results of measurements operated on this system
by the observer. The concept of observer is external to the theory. What-
ever its physical constitution, the observer’s only role is to choose a mea-
surement setting and register the result of the observation: an operational
approach. Correlations between the observer’s choices and results are in-
tuitively taken to be mediated by information carriers: physical systems.
On one view, systems are “lines” or “wires” between “boxes” in symbolic
diagrams connecting various operations on the observer’s information—
a conception that leads to “new modes of explaining physical phenom-
ena” [27, 28, 29]. The old explanatory mode, on the contrary, takes
systems to be constituted through separation from non-systems (mea-
surement devices or the environment): a system is a bouquet of relevant
degrees of freedom jointly denoted by a single name. That such a division,
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although it is not a definition (more on this in Section 4), enables explana-
tion is an idea with a long philosophical history (διι˜λν from διαιρ´ω, to
take apart, Plato Timaeus 41d). We argue, firstly, that the old explana-
tory mode does not apply to device-independent approaches. Secondly, in
the new explanatory mode systems become auxiliary concepts and, like
any accessory tool, have limited utility. Still occasionally employed in the
literature, they represent little more than a counterintuitive and unhelp-
ful remnant of the old regime. Our examples will show that, while it is
not always outright wrong, thinking about physics in terms of systems
sometimes hinders rather than facilitates understanding. It is significant,
then, that the new explanatory mode can produce a physical theory that
does not refer to systems at all.
In quantum mechanics, it is assumed that a measurement setting is
chosen in earnest, i.e., the observer trusts the system to be constituted
of precisely the degrees of freedom described by the theory. What the
system is, is known in advance and is correct. For example, if one performs
a binary measurement of photon polarization, then one expects a priori
that the measurement device will indeed measure photons. This trust in
preparation devices is usually not subject to theoretical scrutiny, yet it is
in principle—and often experimentally—unfounded.
The problem of trust contains a further aspect. If the distinction be-
tween a system and a measurement device is fixed within one laboratory,
then it is usually taken for granted that all other laboratories, should
they come to observe the processes in the first one, will make the same
distinction along the same separation line. The identity of the system
does not depend on the observer; only its state may vary in relation to
the observer’s choice of measurement. The “Wigner’s friend” gedankenex-
periment [80] assumes that different observers will agree on system iden-
tification but disagree on state ascriptions. It is understandable that this
agreement may be a matter of unassailable trust between friends; it has
been put into question and studied mathematically only recently [50, 70].
Absence of trust is a concern that quantum cryptography is designed
to address. It has tools for working with systems of “unspecified char-
acter” [6] or “unknown nature” [7]. A device-independent approach em-
ploys such tools: it is a theoretical investigation performed without relying
on the knowledge of the laws governing the systems’ behaviour. A con-
ventional ‘device’ refers here to any process or apparatus described by
an operational theory, whether classical or quantum, which is explicitly
designated. In this sense, not only a conventional optical table but some-
thing as strange as a closed timelike curve [32, 15] or a Malament-Hogarth
spacetime [34, 57] may be seen as a device. This terminology was first
introduced by Mayers and Yao [64], who developed device-independent
quantum cryptography with imperfect sources. Their suggestion was to
render, through a series of tests, an untrusted but “self-checking” source
equivalent to an ideal one that can be trusted a priori. These tests do
not rely on the degrees of freedom pertinent to the system or, to put it
differently, on our knowledge of the physical theory that describes their
evolution. They only involve inputs and outputs at two separate loca-
tions: a device-independent protocol (Section 2). Over the years quan-
tum cryptography has developed an array of such methods for dealing
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with adversaries which, via action upon sources, effectively turn systems
into untrusted entities. Device-independent protocols are important for
randomness generation [30, 71], quantum key distribution [8], estimation
of the states of unknown systems [7], certification of multipartite entan-
glement [6], and distrustful cryptography [1].
Some of these cryptographic protocols have found a broader use in
quantum information, e.g. device-independent tests are performed on
Bell inequalities, on the assumption that superluminal signaling is im-
possible [5], or on the existence of a predefined causal structure (Sec-
tion 3). But the import of device-independent methods extends even
further. Device-independent methods convert the usually implicit trust of
the observer into a theoretical problem. By doing so, they erase one of the
main dogmas of quantum theory: that it deals with systems. To appreci-
ate the significance of this shift, we compare it with another paradigmatic
change captured by Einstein in the form of a distinction between principle
and constructive theories (Section 4).
This shift is not only due to the import of device-independent meth-
ods from quantum cryptography into general quantum physics. If these
methods have indeed triggered the development, the latter had been pre-
pared by the reconstructions of quantum theory (Section 5). Operational
axiomatic approaches to quantum mechanics focus on the inputs and out-
puts of the observer: a “box” picture. The postulates that successfully
constrain the box to behave according to the rules of quantum theory
become our best candidates for fundamental principles of Nature. In a
device-independent approach, such postulates are also at work: they are
the only content of physical theory along with the inputs and the outputs
of the parties.
Incompatible with the old explanatory mode, device-independent mod-
els typically do not meet the conditions for the emergence of robust the-
oretical constituents corresponding to real objects. By allowing no room
for systems, they inaugurate the obsolescence of this elementary building
block: a theory may contain no systems but remain physical. The spread
of this view from quantum cryptography to general quantum physics (Fig-
ure 1) raises a question of meaning: if physical theory is not about systems,
what is it about? This requires a philosophical (Section 6) as well as a
mathematical (Section 7) investigation. Device-independent models sug-
gest a possible answer: physical theory is about languages (Section 8). Not
only is such a theory possible; the spread of device-independence shows
that it may become routine. Perhaps it indicates the right direction for
moving beyond quantum theory.
2 Physics in a box
Device-independent models are defined as a set of n parties, each of
which ‘selects’ a measurement setting or ‘places’ an input value x1 ∈
X1, . . . , xn ∈ Xn respectively, and ‘subsequently’ ‘obtains’ an output value
or a measurement result a1 ∈ A1, . . . , an ∈ An. The sets X1, . . . ,Xn and
A1, . . . ,An are alphabets of finite cardinality. The verbs used in these
expressions merely convey an operational meaning of the inputs and out-
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Figure 1: Occurrences of the term “device-independent” in the titles of arXiv
physics preprints.
puts; they do not imply that any party exercises free will or has conscious
decision-making procedures. The term ‘subsequently’ introduces a local
time arrow pointing from each party’s input to its output. Although such
local time arrows seem quite intuitive, in full generality they need not be
assumed either. A fully general setting requires, therefore, that absolutely
nothing be postulated about the way inputs are transformed into outputs,
except two conditions: a) these two types of data are clearly distinguished;
b) the process of transformation is physical. Physics is contained in the
probability distribution p = P (a1, . . . , an|x1, . . . , xn) (Figure 2).
All device-independent models studied in the literature introduce fur-
ther constraints on p. The most frequent one is the no-signalling principle:
a choice of measurement by one party must not influence the statistics of
the outcomes registered by a different party. Mathematically, the distribu-
tion p is non-signalling if and only if all one-party marginal probabilities
are functions of their respective inputs xi:
P (ai|x1, . . . , xn) = P (ai|xi). (1)
Although very common, this assumption is not universal: when device-
independent methods are used to test general causal inequalities, the im-
possibility of signalling is not a prerequisite [11].
It is possible to argue that the property of device-independence was al-
ready apparent in Bell’s own formulation of his inequalities [14]. However,
the first proper model featuring non-signalling and device-independence
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Figure 2: In the case of n = 3 parties, physics is fully contained in the proba-
bilities p = P (a1a2a3|x1x2x3).
is to be found in the work of Popescu and Rohrlich [73]. A non-local,
or Popescu-Rohrlich (PR), box describes unknown processes which con-
nect the inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} and the outputs a, b ∈ {0, 1} of two parties
according to the joint distribution
P (ab|xy) =
{
1/2 : a+ b = xy mod 2
0 : otherwise.
The no-signalling constraint implies that, while a PR-box is designed to
go beyond quantum theory, it nevertheless respects the laws of special
relativity. Its device-independent non-local structure accommodates a
violation of the Tsirelson bound [26] by reaching the maximum amount
of correlations in the CHSH inequality. Since PR-boxes allow for more-
than-quantum (often called postquantum) correlations, they cannot be
built experimentally given the current state of knowledge. There exist,
however, experimental approximations with the no-signalling condition
weakened through a coordinated choice of measurement settings [52, 75]
or postselection [62].
Hailed as a “very important recent development” [72], device-indepen-
dent models are characterized by the absence of assumptions about the
internal workings of the box. Its ‘interior’ is not described by a particular
physical theory. The box is unknown territory which, since it is assumed
to be of interest for physical theory, is also a territory of science. The
entire setup belongs within the boundaries of physics (the workings of
the box are not miracles) and, at the same time, it opens a possibility to
redefine these very boundaries. It may be the case that p is consistent
with the predictions of an available physical theory, but if this is not so,
then the meaning of physical theory is appropriately widened to include
the correlations realized by the box.
3 Example: Causal orders
No-signalling is the most commonly used condition on p. Other, usually
more concrete examples are also formulated as information-theoretic con-
straints, e.g., a condition on the security of bit commitment [1]. While
they take the box closer to quantum theory, such assumptions still leave
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Figure 3: A party is fully defined by the input variable X and the output
variable A linked by the map E . The theory does not require any mention of a
physical system S that is first received from the environment and then returned
to it. Adopted with modifications from [12].
enough room for models beyond quantum mechanics, giving quantum the-
ory a place in a broader landscape. Research on ‘indefinite causal orders’
does not rely on a constraint on p imported from quantum communication.
It explores another surprising feature of device-independence: the absence
of global temporal order between the inputs and the outputs associated
with different parties. Each party, for sure, can draw an arrow pointing
from its input to its output, the latter always succeeding the former in
this party’s local frame of reference. While such local time axes are well-
defined, Chiribella [25] following Hardy [54, 55] suggested that there may
not exist a global notion of time. His work pursued a device-dependent
approach, whereby local transformations were taken to be quantum but
the big Hilbert space of all parties contained no information on causal
relations among them. A mathematical formalism called ‘process ma-
trix’ was introduced by Oreshkov, Costa and Brukner to deal with such
situations [67], leading to a set of further studies [3, 21, 22, 2, 59, 10, 42].
In a device-independent approach, a party is defined, not by a local
Hilbert space, but by two random variables: an input X and an output
A, and a map E between them. It is conventional among authors to
mention “a physical system S that a party receives from the environment
and a physical system that is returned to the environment” [12] and to
adduce it to the transformation E (Figure 3). This is not due to any
theoretical necessity: the language merely appends an interpretation of
the mathematical formalism. Three strange consequences follow. Taken
together, they indicate that the notion of system is not a fundamental
ingredient of the device-independent model of indefinite causal orders.
First, the assumption about a physical system first entering, then leav-
ing the laboratory can be rephrased as a condition that each party inter-
acts with the ‘environment’ or the ‘physical medium’ only once:
[Alice and Bob] both open their lab, let some physical system
in, interact with it and send a physical system out, only once
during each run of the experiment. [19]
The notion of environment here involved is a peculiar one. Described as a
whole by the process matrix, it lies outside space-time. ‘Environment’ is
used as a name for a holistic atemporal medium said to supply a system
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to a party. According to the old explanatory mode of physics, a system
is to be constituted through separation from the environment; however,
no separation is possible from this one. If the relevant degrees of freedom
could be divided from the irrelevant ones in this ‘environment’, then the
degrees of freedom pertaining to the system would remain identifiable as
such throughout the experiment. The idea of maintaining (συν´χoντoς)
this separation, or holding together (συνα´γoντoς) the degrees of freedom
that constitute the system, is key to providing cohesion (συγκρατo“υντoς)
of whatever is separated or divided from something else (Numenius 4b).
This is a temporal idea, at least for the time of the experiment: if a system
melts down, or is broken up, or gets absorbed inside the laboratory, then
it ceases to be. The ‘holding together’ of the degrees of freedom happens
in the laboratory’s time, but this local time arrow does not extend to the
holistic environment described by the process matrix. The latter is not in
space-time, hence the impossibility to use a global medium to maintain
separation outside the lab, or to maintain anything tout court. As a result,
the framework of indefinite causal orders cannot accommodate a notion
of system which ‘enters’ or ‘leaves’ the lab from the environment.
Second, in some circumstances, ‘systems’ in the process matrix frame-
work may ‘enter’ the same local laboratory twice: a situation that never
occurs to a physical object. Third, both quantum bipartite and classical
multipartite processes without predefined causal order are logically consis-
tent and therefore allowed by the theory [13]. Causal correlations between
the inputs and the outputs form a polytope that lies in a larger, logically
consistent set that includes non-causal correlations. The latter can be
shown to violate a causal inequality: an analog of Bell inequality that
permits to distinguish between mixtures of predefined causal orders and
its genuine absence. In the quantum framework, violations arise already
with two parties [67]. With three or more parties, it becomes possible
to reach a non-causal point in the larger polytope using only classical
probability theory [10]. This is a surprising finding, implying that even a
classical device-independent framework cannot always be interpreted as a
description of physical systems entering and leaving the laboratories.
These three reasons underscore the difficulty to employ the notion
of system in a device-independent approach. Another line of research
gives weight to this conclusion by addressing the following point: if a sys-
tem ‘traverses’ the laboratory ‘from’ the input ‘towards’ the output, one
should be able to tell its history, i.e., provide a list of events that occurred
to the system in the laboratory. It is, however, impossible; the most rad-
ical manifestation of which is the “quantum liar” paradox [40]. Based
on postselection, this example showcases a paradoxical conclusion that a
future measurement may take an active part in the formulation of the
system’s past history. Thus, a nearly automatic phrase: “a system is pre-
pared at the start of an experiment,” if taken seriously, produces an array
of counterintuitive consequences. This phrase may best be abandoned.
Three versions of the same condition pertaining to experimental in-
vestigation each characterize a particular aspect of physics.
a) To underline the instrumental or the operational aspect, one chooses
as a primitive a unique run of the experiment fully described by an
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input and an output.
b) To put an emphasis on theory as opposed to experiment, the parties
(or the laboratories) are defined, not by spatial arrangements of
instruments, but by an input and an output.
c) On the interpretational side, it is commonly assumed that a physical
system enters a laboratory and then leaves it.
While they seem complementary, these three different readings may not
be equally necessary. The instrumentalism of a) takes a fast route to
establishing the mathematical formalism of physical theory. It is then
sufficient to follow b) for a purely formal investigation as it contains all
the information needed for doing calculations. A ‘system’ in c) is a mere
interpretative device that runs into difficulties when brought to light. It
is the least necessary assumption and, unable to give a hand conceptually
to a) and b), it often becomes counterproductive as it mires the meaning
of physical theory. A theory can be provided by a) and b), without c),
containing no systems while staying physical.
4 Relation to ‘principle theories’
The question about what amounts to a physical theory is usually debated
in the light of a well-known distinction, drawn by Einstein in 1919 [36],
between constructive and principle theories. A paradigmatic example of
principle theories is Einstein’s own special theory of relativity: its entire
edifice is derived from simple postulates that reflect abstract universal
principles of Nature, not the laws of behaviour of a particular kind of
matter. As Einstein noted, such principles serve to “narrow the possibili-
ties” [35]. The same ‘narrowing of possibilities’ is achieved by introducing
constraints on p in the device-independent approach. This suggests a
possible link between the meaning of the latter and Einstein’s distinction.
Special relativity is not a constructive theory, i.e., it remains mute
on the issue of material constitution of the rods and clocks that act as
its measurement devices. Einstein believed that this lack of construc-
tivity was a disadvantage and, consequently, principle theories did not
offer a satisfactory understanding of physics [20]. He kept hoping that
a constructive theory could provide a better understanding of Nature:
“When we say we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural
processes, we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found
which covers the processes in question“ [36]. But Einstein’s desire to
obtain a constructive theory as a replacement of his principle-based spe-
cial relativity never came to be realized. It is tempting to speculate that
device-dependent physics describing concrete physical systems will follow
the same destiny as constructive theories. If, despite Einstein’s wish, no
constructive theory has materialized as a replacement of special relativity,
it is not impossible to imagine that our intuitive desire to ‘fill the box’
with physical systems for the purposes of better explaining physics is as
illusory. The device-independent approach might stay as a legitimate way
of doing physics, without any need to ‘fill the box,’ much in the same
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sense as principle-based special relativity has not been surpassed by any
constructive theory.
Device-independent approaches inaugurate a bigger shift from concrete
physics than Einstein’s principle theories. The latter assume, just as con-
structive theories do too, that the elementary building blocks of physical
theory are physical systems. Constructive theories put a direct emphasis
on this assumption as they begin their development from certain elemen-
tary material constituents. Theoretical entities are, in this case, mere
formal representations of real objects. Principle theories achieve a similar
conclusion from the opposite direction, by postulating general principles
in order to derive a theory of entities constrained by them. Physical sys-
tems are now theoretical constructs to be put in correspondence with the
real objects. None of the two types of theories includes a possibility that
physical theory may not contain any entities, whether real or theoreti-
cal, and may not seek to develop a notion of system. Einstein certainly
did not envision such a physical theory, be it principle or constructive.
In philosophical remarks written in 1949, he states that, even if the di-
rectly perceived and consequently conceptualized sensory impressions are
deceitful candidates for being a part of reality, theoretical entities are
nevertheless necessary in a physical theory:
A basic conceptual distinction, which is a necessary prerequi-
site of scientific and pre-scientific thinking, is the distinction
between “sense-impressions” on the one hand and mere ideas
on the other. There is no such thing as a conceptual definition
of this distinction (aside from circular definitions). Nor can
it be maintained that at the base of this distinction there is a
type of evidence, such as underlies, for example, the distinction
between red and blue. Yet, one needs this distinction in order
to be able to overcome solipsism. Solution: we shall make use
of this distinction unconcerned with the reproach that, in doing
so, we are guilty of the metaphysical “original sin.” [38]
As they reach a new level of abstraction from concrete material reality,
device-independent approaches surpass Einstein’s view that the “sense-
impressions,” now in the form of the inputs and the outputs, must be
connected with the idea of system. But Einstein’s remarks still carry a
deep insight, viz., that a definition of system cannot be given rigorously.
Fundamental theoretical notions cannot be defined without circularity
only based on phenomenal data, because our reading of data is itself
theory-laden; this is why a system does not have a definition. At the
same time, the presence of theoretical entities enables physical explana-
tion. According to Einstein, it is necessary for any physically explanatory
account—a claim to be challenged by device-independent approaches. In
a markedly Kantian development, Einstein uses the argument from use-
fulness to support his position:
It is also the presupposition of every kind of physical think-
ing. Here too, the only justification lies in its usefulness. We
are here concerned with “categories” or schemes of thought,
the selection of which is, in principle, entirely open to us and
whose qualification can only be judged by the degree to which
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its use contributes to making the totality of the contents of
consciousness “intelligible.” [38]
The history of Kantian interpretations of physical theories [31, 17, 69]
teaches us that, on many an occasion, what had been taken a priori by
earlier thinkers, later on became a potentially variable object of scientific
investigation: a relativized a priori [45]. Device-independent approaches
accomplish precisely such a relativization of theoretical entities previously
assumed by Einstein to be necessary for intelligibility. They exhibit a
case in which, contrary to Einstein’s presupposition, the notion of system
can become unhelpful and it is possible to understand a physical model
without recourse to this idea.
5 Relation to the reconstructions of quan-
tum theory
The introduction of principle theories by Einstein and a vision of mathe-
matical physics promoted by the Hilbert program have both contributed
to the rise of quantum axiomatics. This line of research began with the
proposal of quantum logic by von Neumann and Birkhoff in 1935 [16],
showcasing a change in the foundational attitude from a physical enquiry
dealing with real objects to a mathematical formalism that only contains
theoretical entities. In a departure from the Hilbert space quantum me-
chanics, von Neumann “made a confession” in a letter to Birkhoff that he
did not believe in the Hilbert spaces any more [77]. To describe physical
systems in a different way, a correspondence was to be established be-
tween measurements and a projective-geometric structure isomorphic to
an orthomodular lattice. Several decades of research along these lines in
quantum logic yielded multiple proposals for the axioms of quantum the-
ory. Orthodox quantum logic was followed by a reconstruction program
focused on the operational meaning of quantum theory [49]. In contrast
to the previous, heavily mathematical axioms, reconstructions sought to
identify a small set of principles with a clear physical meaning. With no
exceptions, these axiomatizations contained a postulate about the subsys-
tems and the composition rule (e.g., in [53]), whose function was to put a
limit on the amount of correlations that can be reached by the subsystems.
Postulates of this kind reduce the maximally allowed set of bipartite or
multipartite correlations down to the quantum bound; this can only be
achieved, however, if what needs to be derived is already known. The re-
construction program of quantum theory, therefore, sought to reconstruct
an already existing theory.
At the same time, composition rules take extra meaning in a more gen-
eral device-independent approach that goes beyond reconstruction. Imag-
ine that no subsystems are introduced but only a limit on the correlations.
This device-independent setup operates with the inputs and the outputs
of the parties while it contains no notion of system. Now, the available
limit on correlations, acting as a constraint on p, is used to derive the
conditions under which a notion of system would become meaningful.
Systems emerge, then, as a result of some principles, which are usually
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formulated in the information-theoretic language. Device-independent ap-
proaches drive home the importance of such principles: quantum theory
appears as one among several possible information-theoretic models. Its
meaning in this context has a fainter connection than even principle the-
ories with the concrete constituents of matter like atoms or particles:
information-theoretic device-independent theory does not presuppose any
kind of physical system at all.
Should one take quantum theory to be a theory of (a particular kind of)
information? Such proposals appeared even before the advent of device-
independent methods [23, 48], while the latter give them a mathematical
expression. Take the example of the Tsirelson bound [26]. If physics
is captured by the probabilities p, then all of quantum physics, includ-
ing quantum bipartite correlations, must stem from some constraints on
p. Available constraints for the derivation of the Tsirelson bound are
information-theoretic: a limit on communication complexity [76], non-
local computation [61], the possibility of a well-defined classical transi-
tion (macroscopic locality) [63], or information causality [68]. Whichever
assumption one chooses, a non-trivial result is that quantum mechan-
ics emerges in a purely information-theoretic context. It is legitimate to
wonder whether such a theory is still affixed to reality and if yes, in what
sense.
6 Relation to realism
In a well-known argument purporting to show incompleteness of quantum
mechanics, Einstein proclaimed that quantum theory would be complete
if the wavefunction ψ described “the real state of the real system” [37].
While Bell inequalities were used to attack the reality of states, device-
independent methods do away with the idea of real systems. It is con-
ceivable that in the early 1930s Einstein did not even contemplate such
a possibility. Consider the opening lines of the EPR article written by
Podolsky [58]:
Any serious consideration of a physical theory must take into
account the distinction between the objective reality, which
is independent of any theory, and the physical concepts with
which the theory operates. These concepts are intended to
correspond with the objective reality, and by means of these
concepts we picture this reality to ourselves. [39]
A similar dictum can be found in Dirac’s 1930 textbook of quantum me-
chanics, with ‘objective reality’ replaced by the philosophically unambi-
tious ‘physical entities’:
“The most powerful advance would be to perfect and generalize
the mathematical formalism that forms the existing basis of
theoretical physics, and after each success in this direction,
to try to interpret the new mathematical features in terms of
physical entities.” [33]
Device-independent approaches render both philosophies obsolete. If a
theory contains no notion of system, there is no reason to picture reality
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as comprised of physical entities. For sure, device-independent physics
still informs us about Nature but, in a uniquely radical rejection, it does
not support a claim that either Nature or physical theory are constituted
of entities. This is more powerful than the widespread withering away
of entity realism [44], a statement that physical entities are objectively
existing, real things. Systems in the device-independent approach are
unnecessary not only for the purposes of interpretation, but also on the
theoretical side. They cannot correspond to objective reality because they
are absent from the theory. Both in the philosophy of physics and in its
mathematics systems are no more a requirement.
Device-independent methods promote a view that is also more pow-
erful and unusual that the rejection of ‘naive’ realism, which contin-
ues to characterize many working physicists. Naive realism is an unin-
formed form of entity realism stating that the objects of experimental
science, think electrons or photons, are real because the empirical work
and the laboratory heuristic suggest so. First the wave-particle duality,
then Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations and the Kochen-Specker con-
textuality removed all possibility of a consistent account along these lines.
Device-independence runs contrary to the experimental heuristic of naive
realists to such extent that achieving it in the laboratory becomes a seri-
ous challenge. Boxes are usually built out of known systems like photons,
yet no knowledge of such systems can be supposed by the experimenter,
or the setup would immediately turn into a device-dependent one. That
experimentalists often leave unnoticed minor device-dependent assump-
tions shows how counter-intuitive device-independent physics can be for
a naive realist.
A view of reality that comes closest to accommodating device-indepen-
dent approaches was expounded by John Wheeler in an unpublished note-
book [78]:
On this view physics is not machinery. Logic is not oil occa-
sionally applied to that machinery. Instead everything, physics
included, derives from two parents, and is nothing but cathode-
tube image of the interplay between them. One is the “partic-
ipant.” The other is the complex of undecidable propositions
of mathematical logic. . . . The propositions are not proposi-
tions about anything. They are the abstract building blocks,
or “pregeometry,” out of which “reality” is conceived as being
built.
Wheeler’s “machinery” seems to correspond to Einstein’s notion of con-
structive theory, and Wheeler in the notebook contends against its preva-
lent position among practising physicists. The entire excerpt could be
read as an argument in favour of principle theories had it not been for
one key sentence: propositions, according to Wheeler, do not refer to
“anything” and have no semantics, yet they are the building blocks of
a conception of reality. This conception, while being “as full-blown as
anyone could want” [47], stems from an abstract model in a direct con-
sequence of Wheeler’s “participatory” philosophy. Even someone whose
philosophical standpoint may be entirely different cannot help noticing
a curious occurrence, perhaps a first in the philosophy of physics, of a
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view that the propositions are themselves elements of reality and that
they do not need to refer to any entities whatsoever, whether empirical or
theoretical. Device-independent models proceed on a similar view replac-
ing Wheeler’s “undecidable propositions” by an ensemble of operationally
defined inputs and outputs.
7 Example: “Almost quantum” correla-
tions
Some constraints on p allow for an interpretation of the device-indepen-
dent setup in terms of systems. This emergence of systems needs to
be demonstrated mathematically, and an important check is the type of
composition rule for such emerging entities. Quantum theory describes
composition via the tensor product structure. If one posits that the no-
signalling box is described by a global Hilbert space, one needs to test the
availability of the tensor product between the subspaces that characterize
each party. The work on the so-called “almost quantum correlations”
addresses this question [66, 65].
Remarkably, there is enough leeway between two assumptions: the
existence of the global Hilbert space and the tensor product structure of
local subspaces. Rather than by the tensor product, the condition of inde-
pendence of local observables can be captured by commutativity between
two families of projectors pertaining to different parties. Correlations
exhibited by the models based on commutativity relations differ slightly
from quantum correlations: they are “almost” quantum.
The notion of subsystem, and with it the notion of physical system,
is put into question in the device-independent models leading to almost
quantum correlations. This is apparent in the definitions given by several
authors working on this topic. It is not unusual to find a common-sense
expression of device-independence in the familiar language of local sub-
systems:
Consider a scenario where n parties conduct measurements x¯ =
(x1, . . . , xn) on their respective subsystems, obtaining outcomes
a¯ = (a1, . . . , an). [65, our emphasis]
The notion of subsystem involved is, however, different from the usual
one. Rigorously speaking, it has to be defined algebraically:
Subsystems are defined by specifying observable algebras: these
are assumed to be C∗-algebras that mutually commute. [46]
According to common sense, this algebraic definition must be a mere
rephrasing of the usual Hilbert space notion. To check this, one appeals
to the composition rule. It transpires that the result is negative: the
notion of subsystem in the sense of commutativity of subalgebras does
not correspond to the usual idea of physical systems that are statistically
independent [43]. Fritz formulates a conceptual lesson:
It is our point of view that the operation of forming a composite
systemHA⊗HB from its subsystemsHA andHB should not be
a fundamental structure in a physical theory. The point is that
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nature presents us with a huge quantum system which we ob-
serve and conduct experiments on, and in some ways this total
system behaves as if it were composed of smaller parts. Hence it
seems that the correct question would be “When does a phys-
ical system behave like it were composed of smaller parts?”
rather than “How do physical systems compose to composite
systems?”. Note that this is in stark contrast to many other
approaches to the foundations of quantum theory, in which the
operation of forming a composite system from subsystems is a
fundamental structure. [46]
Thus systems in the framework of almost quantum correlations do not
obey ordinary intuition. Even if, as in this example, the new mode of
explaining physical phenomena occasionally refers to systems, one must
remain aware of the pitfalls. A common-sense notion of system is clearly
unhelpful, yet it is no accident that the authors strongly desire that their
framework be explanatory of physics: “The ubiquity of the almost quan-
tum set Q˜ [. . . ] seems to suggest that it emerges from a reasonable (yet
unknown) physical theory” [65, our emphasis]. If such future theory is not
a theory of physical systems, what would it be a theory of? One finds a
tentative answer in a definition using only the strictly necessary concepts:
For Alice (respectively for Bob), an experiment is a process or
black box to which she feeds an input x from the alphabet X
and from which she receives an output a from the alphabet A.
Alphabets X ,Y,A,B are of finite cardinality. [60]
On this view, physical theory is about languages: it is defined by a choice
of alphabets for the inputs and the outputs and by the conditions imposed
on this algebraic structure. Strings, or words in such alphabets, form a
common mathematical background of device-independent approaches.
8 Physical theory is about languages
The origin of the idea that in the foundation of quantum theory should
lie an abstract mathematical model can be traced back to von Neumann’s
first publication on quantum mechanics [56]. Prior to the advent of
device-independent approaches, its meaning was perhaps best expressed
by Wheeler. According to his formulation, a mathematical model should
contain as few assumptions as possible, including the removal of presup-
positions about the Hilbert space, which may reemerge in the course of a
posterior “treatment”:
2. Start with what formal system?
Take a formal system. Enlarge it to a new formal system,
and that again to a new formal system, and so on, by resolv-
ing undecidable propositions (“act of participation”). Will the
system become so complex that it can and must be treated by
statistical means? Will such a treatment make it irrelevant,
or largely irrelevant, with what particular formal system one
started? [78]
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The conclusion drawn at the end of the previous section, viz., that
physical theory is about languages, belongs to Wheeler’s methodological
lineage, although one will likely learn more about the relation between
individual “treatment” and mathematical formalism as other device-in-
dependent models come to light. The meaning of ‘physical’—a term
Wheeeler did not use in his notes—usually implies a semantic reading
in the form of a statement that the theory ‘describes’ some entities or is
‘about something.’ But the examples given in Sections 3 and 7 support a
new reading of Wheeler’s statement that “propositions are not about any-
thing.” On this view, device-independent physical models are not ‘about’
systems. A semantic interpretation, or ‘aboutness,’ although not neces-
sarily wrong, is adduced at a later stage and sometimes proves unhelpful
for understanding physics. Remove it: now a new interpretation need to
be given to the bare mathematical formalism.
If, as Wheeler said, physical theory “is not about anything”—not
about any thing—what is it about? It is tempting to answer, as hinted
in Section 5, that physical theory is about information or a special kind
thereof. Not all conceptual problems, however, get so resolved. If infor-
mation is a more fundamental substance, does it come in many kinds or
varieties? One possibility would be that such types of information are all
similar in structure (obeying the concept of information, e.g., as defined
by Shannon [74]) but vary in the values of some parameters. Another
option is to radically distinguish one notion of information (e.g., informa-
tion that cannot be cloned) from all others [24]. But if quantum theory
is about information that cannot be cloned, one is left wondering who
is the agent trying to clone it. This interpretation still leaves open the
problem of observer who ‘stores’ and ‘handles’ information. In our view,
such conundrums are misleading, because the term ‘information’ is not re-
quired to drive home the point of device-independent approaches. ‘What
is physical theory about?’—it is only appropriate to search for an answer
by looking at the mathematical formalism of device-independent methods.
What needs to be understood, therefore, is the common conceptual back-
ground of the various mathematical constraints on p. Such a background
should become a common philosophical denominator of physics in lieu of
Shannon’s or von Neumann’s information theory. It should also leave no
open interpretational gaps such as a reference to a meta-theoretic agent.
Section 7 gives an example of a physical model based on strings in
finite alphabets. In a device-independent approach, only an empirical in-
terpretation of such strings is readily available: they are the operationally
defined input-output records. As in Shannon’s theory of information, it
is possible to study them in a purely formal way irrespectively of their
semantics. The entities that the strings are purportedly ‘about’ are ir-
relevant constructs and, even when they are referred to under the name
of ‘systems,’ they have no bearing on how the construction of the theory
proceeds mathematically.
Wheeler’s methodology provides guidance: at the beginning, “take a
formal system.” In a rebuttal of his position, one could argue that a
semantic view of device-independent models is necessary if the theory is
to be physical rather than purely mathematical: physical, hence somehow
relating to nature. A minimal requirement would be to link with empirical
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data. Wheeler’s “not about anything” can be circumvented by keeping the
preposition “about” while clearing oneself of “any thing”: in the absence of
semantics, the only available interpretation is ‘about languages.’ If strings
are not ‘about’ some elements of reality, they can be said to be ‘about’
languages from which they are formed. These languages are the only
remaining theoretical constituents, making the ‘about-languages’ reading
a minimal interpretation one level below ‘about-systems.’ The emphasis
on languages rather than physical entities is not new in the philosophy of
physics. Niels Bohr underlined the role of language:
Bohr went on to say that the terms of discussion of the ex-
perimental conditions and of the experimental results are nec-
essarily those of ‘everyday language,’ suitably ‘refined’ where
necessary, so as to take the form of classical dynamics. [18,
p. 38].
While Bohr’s attention was focused on everyday language and classical dy-
namics, the connection he identified between them is instructive: a ‘refine-
ment’ of a linguistic structure produces a physical description. The same
methodology applies to device-independent models, bar the replacement
of everyday language by a formal notion of language. A set of conditions
then ‘refines’ this concept producing a full-blown physical theory.
A sketch of a purely formal study of strings that form the foundation of
physical theory runs as follows, bearing a slight resemblance to Wheeler’s
suggestion that a particular formal system one started with may become
“largely irrelevant.” The constrains imposed on the set of all possible
strings pick out a subset of allowed words. A valuation is introduced on
this set, which enables the use of the probability calculus. Its meaning can
be read on many levels: (a) as a prediction of measurement results; (b) as
an update of the observer’s information; (c) as emergent causal relations
between events; (d) as a correlation between particular inputs and out-
puts. As in Shannon’s theory, the choice of interpretation has no bearing
on mathematical results. Their minimal conceptual import is that they
mean no more than what they are: an algebraic, or a linguistic, structure.
Geometric constructs, including the Hilbert space of quantum theory, do
not underwrite this minimal reading as they tend to be device-dependent.
In a device-independent approach, the notion of state space is absent;
this, in turn, removes the necessity of pointing to the system which this
state space describes. Physical theory, on this minimal reading, is about
an algebraic structure formed by the strings obeying certain conditions:
a view of a physical theory about languages.
This view has precedents in the history of quantum theory [51]. In
the 1950s, Hugh Everett argued that the observer is characterized by
memory, i.e., “parts... whose states are in correspondence with past expe-
rience” [41]. A modern, functional definition of memory is that it serves
to store strings. Everett’s understanding of the observer is, then, in line
with a view that relies on strings as fundamental elements of physical
theory. Several decades later, Wojciech Zurek suggested that algorithmic
complexity of the observer’s description of the state of the system ought
to be added to physical entropy [82, 81]. His interpretation involved full-
blown quantum theory. This need not be so: the observer’s information
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can, in a reversal of Zurek’s strategy, be viewed as a fundamental ingre-
dient without any semantic content. Mathematically, once again, it only
involves strings in a finite alphabet in which the observer operates.
Device-independent approaches exacerbate the need for a minimal con-
ceptual reading to support the mathematical formalism. An algebraic
foundation leads to a common philosophical denominator of the opera-
tional models focused on the inputs and the outputs, which only relies
on the abstract content of the theory. An extended interpretation would
adduce ‘systems’ as remnants of the old explanatory mode; a minimal
one removes all semantic content but it is also more amenable to mathe-
matical analysis that the vaguer “physics is about information.” While,
mathematically speaking, information comes in only two varieties: Shan-
non and von Neumann, the statement that “physical theory is based on
languages” opens up a multitude of choices among the formal structures
of algebraic coding theory. It introduces new tools yet unused in physics;
what is more, unlike the informational interpretation, it does not refer to
a meta-theoretical agent. Similarly to the creation of an abstract, non-
semantic theory of information by Shannon, a device-independent model
based on languages provides a minimal but sufficient ground for physical
theory.
9 Conclusion
In quantum cryptography, it has always been allowed, even customary, to
ask the anathema question of physical theory: what if a preparation or a
measurement device is cheating on the experimenter? Is it still possible to
obtain meaningful results? Under the influence of cryptography, quantum
theory developed a way of doing physics that can accommodate such ques-
tions: a device-independent approach. Conceptually, device-independence
does not require that the notion of system be present in physical theory.
It is then legitimate to ask what such a new physical theory is about.
Device-independent models of indefinite causal orders and almost quan-
tum correlations suggest a possible answer: it is about languages. Like
information-theoretic postulates that lead to the derivation of quantum
theory in the operational framework, particular constraints on languages
produce a device-independent model that exhibits characteristic features
of quantum theory. Further consequences of this novel view of physical
theory remain to be explored both conceptually and mathematically.
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